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Abstract. Pareto based his interpretation of business cycles on a disaggregated general 
equilibrium system with dynamics determined by frictions (or “inertia”). The present 
article investigates his interpretation of the motion of the economic aggregate, in the 
sense of the set of individual consumers and producers forming the economic system 
in general equilibrium. Did Pareto develop a representative agent model avant la lettre? 
This is discussed from the double perspective of Pareto’s interpretation of the synchro-
nism of economic “vibrations” and his rejection of the analytical relevance of the 
“Robinson Crusoe” economy. He was aware that the general equilibrium system could 
not provide a practical method of solving the equations for each and every individual. 
This has been called the “Cournot problem” in the literature, as Augustin Cournot was 
the first to state it. Pareto reacted to that problem by defining economics as the study 
of average phenomena involving large numbers in repeated markets.
Keywords : Vilfredo Pareto, macroeconomics, economic aggregate, averages, 
Cournot problem.
Résumé. Pareto fonde son interprétation des cycles économiques sur un système d’équi-
libre général caractérisé par des dynamiques de friction (ou d’inertie). Le présent article 
examine la manière dont il interprète les grands mouvements économiques à l’aune 
de l’ensemble des individus (consommateurs et producteurs) constituant le système 
économique à l’équilibre général. Pareto développe-t-il un modèle à agents représen-
tatifs avant la lettre ? Cette thèse fait l’objet d’une discussion dans la double perspective 
de l’interprétation par Pareto du synchronisme des « vibrations économiques » et de 
son rejet de la pertinence analytique du cas d’une économie à la « Robinson Crusoe ». 
Il était conscient du fait que le système de l’équilibre général ne saurait fournir de 
méthode pratique apte à résoudre les équations propres à chacun des individus. Cette 
aporie formulée une première fois par Augustin Cournot est connue en science écono-
mique sous le nom de « problème de Cournot ». En réaction à ce problème, Pareto 
entreprend de définir la science économique comme l’étude des phénomènes moyens 
impliquant un grand nombre d’agents et sur des marchés répétés.
Mots-clés : Vilfredo Pareto, macroéconomie, ensemble économique, moyennes, 
problème de Cournot.
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INTRODUCTION
Macroeconomics established itself as a separate field in the 1930s, when 
the general interdependence between agents in the economy as a whole star-
ted to be modelled at an aggregate level with a small number of markets 
(consumption and capital goods, money, bonds and labour). This is well 
illustrated by John Hicks’s (1937) IS-LM model and by part IV of his Value and 
Capital (see e.g. De Vroey, 2004). Hicks’s approach to macroeconomics combi-
ned different strands in economic theory: Léon Walras and Vilfredo Pareto’s 
general equilibrium analysis, Knut Wicksell’s saving-investment framework, 
Irving Fisher and Alfred Marshall’s quantity theory of money tradition, and 
Keynes’s theory of the determination of aggregate output and employment. 
Hicks ([1939] 1946) referred extensively to Pareto’s theory of consumer beha-
viour and general economic equilibrium in other parts of his book, but, like 
most macroeconomists at the time, he did not take notice of Pareto’s attempted 
treatment of the “dynamics of the economic aggregate” in chapter IV of the 
second volume of the Cours d’Économie politique (1964 [1896-1897]; translated as 
“Economic Crises”, 2005 [1896-1897]).
In contrast with prevailing Wicksellian and Fisherian aggregative 
approaches to fluctuations in nominal and real variables, Pareto based his 
interpretation of business cycles on a disaggregated general equilibrium system 
with dynamics determined by frictions (or “inertia”). Except for a few Italian 
economists, Pareto’s approach had no impact on business cycle theory in the 
interwar period. This reflects the fact that Italian economic culture found it 
difficult to accept the shift to aggregative macroeconomic models that came 
to dominate economic dynamics at the time (Pomini and Tusset, 2009). 
Indeed, Giovanni Demaria (1952 [1949]), long-time editor of the Giornale degli 
economisti, claimed that Pareto’s main contribution to economics was to frame 
equilibrium as a complex relation between individuals instead of “ephemeral” 
aggregates. The present article investigates Pareto’s interpretation of the motion 
of the economic aggregate, in the sense of the set of individual consumers 
and producers forming the economic system. This is distinct from the usual 
notion of economic aggregates as measured by adding up the algebraic sum of 
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the individual supply and demand functions over the whole economy. Pareto’s 
general “conception of economic aggregate finds an analogy in the conception 
which an astronomer has of the solar system when he has apprehended the 
general equations of mechanics” (1897, p.493). 
From Pareto’s general equilibrium perspective, economic activity is geared 
to the satisfaction of consumers’ wants. The microeconomic theory of consu-
mer behaviour provides the foundation of the modelling of the economic 
system, which is seen as a circular flow between individuals and firms in the 
markets for goods and factor services, as illustrated by figure  40 of his Manuel 
d’Économie politique (translated as Manual of Political Economy, 1971 [1909]; see also 
Weintraub, 1979, chapter 1). Pareto regarded the “individual economy” – in the 
sense of the pure-exchange competitive equilibrium model, where prices are 
taken as given by individual traders – as the benchmark for economic theory as 
a whole. In paragraph 928 of his Cours (op.cit.), he put forward a model of cyclical 
oscillation in individual consumption, and claimed that it established the ability 
of pure economics to explain the movements of the economic aggregate. It was 
the first attempt (even if not entirely successful) in the literature to infer the 
business cycle from optimal economic behaviour (Boianovsky and Tarascio, 
1998; Bridel, 2012). Did Pareto develop a representative agent model avant la 
lettre? This is discussed below, from the double perspective of Pareto’s interpre-
tation of the synchronism of economic “vibrations” and his rejection of the 
analytical relevance of the Robinson Crusoe economy.
Pareto imported from physics not just the mechanical metaphor but also 
the experimental method as the only scientific procedure. Differently from 
Walras, he regarded general equilibrium as an instrument to understand 
economic facts through successive approximations, not as a normative ideal 
(Ingrao and Israel, 1990, chapter 5; Marchionatti and Gambino, 1997). Although 
aggregate variables were not part of his pure economics equations, they were 
important in testing demand and other economic functions on aggregate data 
through statistics. Pareto’s empirical discussion of the business cycle was based 
on changes in aggregate consumption and savings as indicated by data on the 
velocity of circulation of bank deposits. He was aware that the general equi-
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librium system, for informational and algebraic reasons, could not provide a 
practical method of solving the equations for each and every individual. This 
has been called the “Cournot problem” in the literature, as Augustin Cournot 
was the first to state it. As documented below, Pareto reacted to that problem 
by defining economics as the study of average phenomena involving large 
numbers in repeated markets. Whereas Pareto’s economics was based on the 
assumption of essential similarities between economic agents, in his sociology 
Pareto ([1916] 1935) stressed instead social heterogeneity among individuals 
and their division into aggregate socio-economic classes.
I. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM AND AVERAGES
In chapter 11 of his Recherches, titled “Of the Social Income”, Cournot 
(1897 [1838]) called attention to some analytical hurdles entailed by interde-
pendence in the economic system. According to Cournot, a “complete and 
rigorous” solution of the problems relative to any of the parts of the economy 
makes it necessary “to take the entire system into consideration”. However, 
“this would surpass the powers of mathematical analysis and of our practi-
cal methods of calculation, even if the values of all constants could be assig-
ned to them numerically” (ibid., p.127-28). This pointed to the general equili-
brium approach later introduced by Walras and further developed by Pareto 
(Schumpeter, 1954, p.960; Solow, 2007, p.107). Pareto claimed the theoretical 
relevance of general equilibrium analysis as “the only means as yet known” 
for understanding the determination of the value of economic variables. But at 
the same time he acknowledged that general equilibrium equations “cannot be 
of practical use to us for numerical calculations of quantity and price”, which 
was precisely the problem Cournot pointed out. Even assuming that “we have 
overcome all the difficulties in the way of acquiring knowledge of the data 
of the problem”, which is “already an absurd hypothesis”, there remains the 
“practical matter that is beyond the power of algebraic analysis” to solve the 
“fabulous number of equations which a population of forty million individuals 
and several thousand goods would entail” (Pareto, 1971 [1909], p.171).
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Hayek (1942, p.291) quoted Pareto’s remarks and noted its connection 
with the passage from Cournot. As observed by Hayek, Pareto clearly saw 
the distinction between the ability of the system of equations to provide a 
comprehensive picture of the mutual interdependence of market phenomena 
and its inability to predict the precise effects of any particular change (see also 
Hayek’s 1975 Nobel lecture, p.437). After Hayek, Friedman argued that Walras’s 
general equilibrium emptied “Cournot’s problem” (1955, p.904) – as Friedman 
called it for the first time – of its practical content by producing an idealized 
picture of the economic system with no application to concrete issues. The 
difficulties posed by the Cournot problem have been part of economic theory 
(especially macroeconomics) ever since (Hoover, 1988, chapter 9.2). Cournot’s 
own attempted suggestion was to introduce aggregate concepts such as “social 
income” and by that reduce the number of variables (1897 [1838], chapters 11 
and 12). He did not get very far in anticipating the macroeconomic approach, 
though (Schumpeter, 1954, p.960; Solow, 2007). 
The Cournot problem is even more acute in Pareto’s than in Walras’s 
version of the general equilibrium system. This is because, differently from 
Walras’s complex procedure, the Italian economist did not aggregate individual 
supply and demand equations to obtain market supply and demand functions 
(Demaria, 1952 [1949]; van Daal and Walker, 1990). According to Demaria, 
Pareto, by insisting on the subjective character of economic interdependence 
and interpreting the system of equations as “a complex of necessarily individual 
relations” (ibid., p.633), went farther than Walras. Interdependence is a subjec-
tive datum in Paretian economics, in the sense that the economic problem 
consists of the choices of individuals, “not of the mass”, as put by Demaria. 
In particular, “all relations which appear as aggregate – and which lead to the 
so-called macroeconomics – are considered as accidental, ephemeral, and 
impermanent, only approximately universal or not universal at all” (ibid.). A 
seen by Demaria  (ibid., p.637), Pareto’s discussion of general equilibrium as 
exclusively a system of relations among individuals was his major contribution 
to economics. Demaria acknowledged that the temptation to using “mass cate-
gories” comes from the attempt to overcome an “infinitely complex reality”, 
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but claimed that aggregative or “synthetic” reasoning did not add new insights 
to the pure universal hypotheses of disaggregative microeconomic general 
equilibrium (ibid., p.636-637; see Weintraub, 1979, p.7). Pareto  (1964  [1896-
1897], §100) showed that it is not necessary to aggregate over individuals in 
order to establish that all markets can clear. This approach may entail the disap-
pearance of markets from view and render the Cournot problem more difficult 
to tackle, which might explain Walras’s cold reception of Pareto’s version of 
general equilibrium (van Daal and Walker, 1990, p.499-500).
W.S. Jevons’s (1965 [1871]) notion of “trading bodies” provided yet another 
way to deal with the difficulties posed by the large amount and variety of indivi-
duals in the economy. This is related to, but not quite the same as, the Cournot 
problem. Although economic theory investigates the “conditions of a mind”, prac-
tically it focuses on an “aggregate of individuals”. This is so because the operation 
of general economic laws does not apply to the vagaries of individual behaviour, 
whose actions are “beyond the analytic power of science”. Such laws can only be 
detected in average or aggregate behaviour, on the assumption of a “high proba-
bility that accidental and disturbing causes will operate in the long run […] so 
as to neutralise each other”. Therefore, claimed Jevons, “questions which appear, 
and perhaps are, quite indeterminate as regards individuals, may be capable of 
exact investigation and solution to great masses and wide averages” (ibid., p.15-16). 
The behaviour of the aggregate or average agent is more stable and continuous 
than that of an individual agent, which means that differential calculus can only 
be used in the first case. Jevons’s concept of the “trading body” as representing 
any trader (whether an individual or a group of individuals) in a market aimed 
at minimising the problem of commodity indivisibility and discontinuities in 
exchange theory (White, 2001). He defined a trading body as “any body either of 
buyers or sellers. The trading body may be a single individual in one case; it may 
be the whole inhabitants of a continent in another; it may be the individuals of a 
trade diffused through a country in another” (Jevons, 1965 [1871], p.88). 
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Aspects of Jevons’s argument – that aggregate demand functions in every 
market are continuous because of the operation of the law of large numbers – could 
be also found in Cournot (1897 [1838], p.49-50), Walras (1954 [1874], p.95) and 
Marshall (1990 [1890], p.83). However, the same was not true of Jevons’s concept 
of “trading body”, with its not fully developed notion of collective marginal 
utility. Walras (ibid., p.206) and Marshall (ibid., p.674) rejected the concept for its 
reference to a world of “fictitious mean” (Jevons, op.cit., p.90) and for ignoring 
differences of marginal utility of money among its members, respectively. There 
are no records of Pareto’s reactions to Jevons’s trading body. He would not reject 
it on the same grounds as Walras, as the notion of average phenomena played 
an important role in Pareto’s economic framework (Baranzini and Bridel, 2005). 
In one of his first articles, Pareto stated “Political Economy cannot but be a 
science of averages, and it cannot aspire at predicting and explaining merely acts 
of single individuals” (2007 [1892-1893], p.65). In the same vein, Pareto poin-
ted out that economic theory is only able to predict general market demand, 
not singular demand by a given individual (1964 [1896-1897], §37). Economics 
would reach “absurd results” if it studied “individual and singular” phenomena 
instead of “general and average” ones (ibid., §645). As part of Pareto’s positivist 
methodology, the explanation of individual choices should be kept separated 
from psychology and the quest for internal unobservable factors. Accordingly, 
economics should aim at the logic of observable repeated market behaviour 
(see also Teira, 2006). Economic propositions in general (and demand theory in 
particular) must be tested on aggregate statistical data. 
In political economy […] we consider only average phenomena and those 
involving large numbers. We speak of individuals, not in order actually to 
investigate what one individual consumes or produces, but only to consider 
one of the elements of a collectivety and then add up the consumption and the 
production of a large number of individuals (Pareto, 1971 [1909], p.123).
The premise that economics studies only “average and frequently repea-
ted phenomena” implied that quantities in the equations should be expressed 
as flows per unit of time (Pareto, 1955 [1911], p.69). Pareto clarified that the 
substitution of continuous variations for discontinuous ones could led to errors 
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only if what was involved was a study of “individual psychology” instead of a 
“science of averages and large numbers” (2008 [1900], p.462). This was explai-
ned in the chapter about business cycles, where he pointed out that, while 
investigating the conditions of equilibrium,
we should eschew the consideration of isolated examples of consumption and 
devote our attention to daily, monthly or annual consumption. Moreover, this is 
the true purpose of political economy. If a mother happens to buy her son a bar 
of chocolate, or if a worker, perspiring from his labours, drinks a glass of bear, 
these are psychological facts. Political economy must confine itself to conside-
ring the annual consumption of chocolate or beer. We must consider averages 
and equalise, by means of compensation, the differences between the social 
facts we have isolated (Pareto, 1964 [1896-1897], §928; 2005 [1896-1897], p.8).
Economics does not take into account details of different choices of each 
individual, just like “the geographer describes the earth without counting the 
grains of sand” (ibid).1 
Pareto’s concept of equilibrium as an “average state” indicates that he 
understood it as a “statistical equilibrium” with variations compensating 
one another. This is illustrated in the Cours (ibid., §718, §925) by the notion 
that in a given industry in equilibrium some firms make losses and others 
make profits, although in the aggregate they break even. It was only later 
that Pareto made explicit that, in both economics and sociology, equilibrium 
is “analogous to the state of statistical equilibrium in the kinetic theory of 
gases” (1935 [1916], §2074; see also Tusset, 2013). For instance, the statement 
that the consumption of a commodity is constant through time does not 
mean that every individual consumes the same amount each year, as “such 
numbers vary widely”. It does mean that “the variations more or less offset 
one another, so that the resultant is zero or, to be more exact, approximately 
zero”, according to the “laws of probabilities”. This was similar to Jevons’s 
resort to probabilities to justify the use of average variables. The common 
influence behind both Jevons and Pareto was Adolphe Quetelet’s (1991 [1835]) 
1 On Pareto’s project to separate economics from psychology and study the “facts” of choice 
instead of their “essence”, see Bruni, 2009.
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seminal concept of l’homme moyen based on the view that human behaviour is 
normally distributed according to the law of large numbers. 
Quetelet’s influence on Jevons has been well documented in the literature 
(Mosselmans, 2005), but the role of the “average man” in Pareto’s framework 
has been usually overlooked. Pareto referred to Quetelet’s (op.cit.) demographic 
studies in his chapter on population2 and observed that 
The works of Quetelet are still a model of method to be deployed in social 
sciences. The jokes some scientists make about Quetelet’s average man only 
prove that one may be an expert in a particular science and yet know absolu-
tely nothing about social sciences (Pareto, 1964 [1896-1897], §178).
Quetelet’s project of “social physics” – in the sense of reducing the metho-
dology of social sciences to that of physical sciences by means of statistics – was 
dear to Pareto. This clearly shows in the detailed discussion of index numbers 
of purchasing power of money and real income in paragraphs 383-400 and 
643-652 of his Cours, a topic that also attracted Jevons’s attention. From Pareto’s 
perspective, the main issue was the impossibility to rigorously compare the 
ophelimity (utility) of two different men or of the same man in two distinct 
moments. The way to lift the difficulty was to suppose men – that “may repre-
sent the averages of certain classes” – always identical to themselves while 
economic conditions change. Such “hypothetical man” is an “average man” 
that differs from the “real man”, but this is true of all sciences dealing with 
“human sensations” (ibid., §384). There is no contradiction between the propo-
sition that the ophelimities of different individuals cannot be compared and 
the daily comparisons of welfare of certain individuals with the welfare of 
others. While the first one deals with two determinate individuals, the second 
refers to certain “average types” that share a “certain background of qualities 
common to the compared men”, even if differences are taken into account in 
the next stage. This explains why the welfare of an Englishman can be compa-
red to the welfare of a Frenchman, or why one can decide whether medieval 
man was more or less happy than modern man (ibid., §645-649). 
2 On Pareto’s contributions to demography, see Boianovsky, 2001.
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Apart from a brief cryptic remark that Pareto “considers dynamic abstrac-
tions as a mere problem of averages” (1952 [1949], p.647), Demaria did not 
dwell on Pareto’s treatment of averages or the matter of their compatibility 
with general equilibrium analysis and focus on individual behaviour. This 
leads to the notion of the representative agent, discussed next. 
2. ROBINSON CRUSOE AND THE REPRESENTATIVE AGENT
General equilibrium analysis was an attempt do deal with the difficulty deri-
ved from “the large number of individuals who […] in proceeding to make choices, clash, 
back each other and struggle with one another” (Pareto, 2008 [1900], p.459). 
Differently from some neoclassical economists in the late 19th century (see 
White, 1987), Pareto rejected the use of Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe as a meta-
phor to study decisions by maximizing economic agents. He acknowledged in 
the Cours (op.cit., t.II, p.399) that the metaphor of an isolated individual could illus-
trate some aspects of the allocation process – such as the distribution of labour 
effort between consumption and investment (as done by Böhm-Bawerk, 1891 
[1889], book I, chapter IV) – but criticized the relevance of the Crusoe economy 
as a representation of supply and demand theory and as a way out of the diffi-
culty posed by the interaction between economic agents.
If we were to formulate a theory for Robinson Crusoe without his man Friday, 
our task would not be too difficult; but we have to elaborate a theory for a 
man living in society and we must concern ourselves with the many kinds 
of actions and reactions which are met in that case […] We shall see that 
pure economics will use the same procedures as rational mechanics and has 
several points of contact with that science (Pareto, 2008 [1900], p.459; see 
also Pareto, 1963 [1898], p.125 for a similar passage).
Pareto’s attitude toward the Crusoe economy was similar to Böhm-Bawerk’s 
(1891, p.379-381). The Crusoe economy could illuminate the relation of men to 
external goods (e.g. individual demand functions for goods), but not the relation 
between men in the market, called “microcosm” and “macrocosm” respecti-
vely by the Austrian economist (see also Böhm-Bawerk, 1891 [1889],  p.105). 
Böhm-Bawerk’s meaning of “macrocosm” was close to Pareto’s “economic 
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aggregate”, in the sense of the set of relations formed by the market econo-
mic system as a whole. The term “macrocosm” was not used to denote aggre-
gate economic variables as in “macroeconomics”, although Böhm-Bawerk did 
contribute to what Schumpeter (1954, p.997-998) called the Quesnay-Ricardo-
Böhm-Bawerk-Wicksell tradition of “macroanalysis” of the distribution of aggre-
gate output. Böhm-Bawerk pointed out that the study of the “microcosm” was a 
necessary step for a proper understanding of the working of the “macrocosm”.
Pareto’s criticism of the Crusoe metaphor did not mean that he rejec-
ted individual behaviour as the foundation of general equilibrium equations. 
Whereas the Crusoe economy “after all, moved [economics] away considerably 
from reality”, 
on the contrary, it is useful to consider in isolation a trader who is in a market 
where prices are supposed to be given. There is thus a study of the individual 
economy, similar to the study of the movement of a material point made by 
dynamics. One gets closer to reality by considering two traders and, eventually, 
any number of them (Pareto, 1964 [1896-1897], t.II, p.399). 
Pareto devised the term “individual economy” (économie individuelle) 
to express the choice problem of the maximizing individual consumer 
(2007  [1892-1893]  p.19; 1964 [1896-1897], §56; 1971 [1909], p.407). He 
often stressed the analytical identity between the equation describing the 
equilibrium of the consumer in pure economics and the equation of virtual 
movement of the equilibrium of a material point in mechanics (1964 [1896-
1897], §586; 1963 [1898], p.127; see also Donzelli, 1997, section 1; Boianovsky 
and Tarascio, 1998, p.6). In the same vein, the “economic aggregate” corres-
ponded to a “mechanical system” formed by a number of material points 
(Pareto,  1964  [1896-1897], §592; 1897, p.493). The pure-exchange model of 
the “individual economy” provided the theoretical foundation on which gene-
ral equilibrium analysis was built: the “equations given for economic equili-
brium are the individual equations” (Pareto, 1964 [1896-1897], §973). Surely, 
this did not mean that the economist knew the parameters of each equation. As 
explained by Pareto in the final chapter (“Résumé Général”) of his Cours, “in 
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pure theory we posed equations for each individual in the aggregate, by leaving 
indeterminate the constants that characterize each individual” (ibid., t.II, p.408). 
From both theoretical and empirical perspectives, what matters is the 
average outcome of the social interaction displayed by the general equili-
brium system, not the solutions to each individual equation, which remain 
unknown. The issue is related to Jevons’s notion of “trading bodies” discussed 
above. As suggested by Negishi (1989, p.326-327) and White (1994, p.434), 
the trading body concept may be interpreted as the first use of the repre-
sentative individual device in economics.3 However, differently from modern 
usage (see  e.g.  Sargent, 1979, p.371), Jevons pointed out the heterogeneity of 
households instead of their homogeneity – indeed, that is what was behind his 
notion of “average” in the first place. The average laws applying to persons in 
a community “will come under what I have elsewhere called the ‘Fictitious 
Mean’, that is to say, they are numerical results which do not pretend to repre-
sent the character of any existing thing”. This did not render the concept 
useless, “for the movements of trade and industry depend upon averages and 
aggregates, not upon the whims of individuals” (Jevons, 1965 [1871], p.90). 
This remark indicates that methodological individualism did not play the same 
role in Jevons’s economics as in the modern search for the “microfoundations” 
of macroeconomics (see also Backhouse and Boianovsky, 2013). 
Like Jevons, Pareto pointed out the relevance of averages, but did not deploy 
the “trading bodies” device to represent them (except for a partial exception 
discussed below). According to Jevons, economic laws are not the same in the 
case of aggregates and individuals, “unless all those individuals were of the 
same character and position as regards wealth and habits” (1965 [1871], p.15). 
Differences in the “character” of particular groups (as displayed in class and race 
behaviour) played an important role when it came to practical applications and 
verification of the theory (White, 1994). Pareto brought in such differences of 
character and social heterogeneity at a later stage in his analysis only, when he 
3 This is overlooked by Hartley’s (1997, chapter 2) investigation of the historical origins of the 
representative agent, which focuses on Marshall’s “representative firm”. 
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established what has become known as the statistical “Pareto law” governing the 
functional form for income distribution among individuals (1964 [1896-1897], 
book III, chapter I; 1971 [1909], chapter 7; see Kirman, 1998, p.28-32). The regu-
lar pattern of inequality of income distribution reflected, according to Pareto, 
the fact that society is hierarchically defined on the basis of physical, moral and 
intellectual differences among individuals (1971 [1909], p.281). This eventually 
led to Pareto’s (1935 [1916]) sociological theory of the “circulation of elites”. The 
individual equations used in the elaboration of the general equilibrium system 
are not valid anymore when social heterogeneity is taken into account:
In the Introduction we had to begin with a study of the individual economy. The 
laws of supply and demand that were obtained in that case are not at all those 
that we have when we consider a whole society, where there is a given distri-
bution of income (Pareto, 1964 [1896-1897], §973).4
The theory of distribution leads us to gather in groups those different indivi-
duals and their corresponding equations. The laws of supply and demand then 
appear under a different aspect than the one they had when isolated indivi-
duals were considered (ibid., t.II, p.408-409).
Pareto, however, did not develop the equations of general economic equili-
brium for different classes or groups of society. Instead, as Tarascio (1969, p.102) 
has pointed out, he would approach the issue from a sociological perspective 
(Pareto, [1916] 1935), where the economic process would no longer be moulded 
in the framework of the behaviour of individual elements, but in terms of the 
behaviour of social aggregates and their interdependence (see also Tusset, 2013). 
According to Tarascio, one should look at Pareto’s sociology in order to find 
his macroeconomics, especially in the form of cyclical aggregate oscillations 
caused by the non-logical actions of “rentiers” and “speculators” groups (see 
also Boianovsky and Tarascio, 1998, section 4). The present discussion is restric-
ted to Pareto’s treatment of the dynamics of the economic aggregate within 
the limits of his pure economics, where social heterogeneity is not conspi-
cuous. Indeed, in a letter to Vladimiro Furlan of 11 October 1907 (reproduced 
4 By “introduction” Pareto meant paragraphs 1-154 of the Cours, titled “Principes d’économie 
politique pure”.
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in Pareto, 1975, p.608-609; see also Mornati, 2008, p.181-182), Pareto stated that 
pure economics dealt with two kinds of problems: (i) “how an individual or a 
class of individuals entirely similar decide their choices” and (ii) “how economic 
goods are distributed in a society formed by such individuals or classes”. The 
latter is the problem of “economic equilibrium” properly. Pareto added:
When we discuss a class of persons entirely similar, we mean not just physio-
logically similar, but also similar in the circumstances in which they find 
themselves, in what they own and earn, etc.; where in reality it would be better 
always to discuss one single individual; at least while we want to elaborate a 
general theory; and then, in the applications, we may try to have classes (ibid).
Pareto’s claim that economic theory should deal with just one single indi-
vidual may look surprising, but there is some textual evidence to support that 
statement. For instance, in his Manuel (1971 [1909], chapter III, §87) he argued 
that the quantities of goods “transformed” by different individuals in their 
consumption choices might be added up, so that “any number of consumers 
may be replaced by a single fictitious consumer who represents them all taken 
together”. The argument was developed diagrammatically only, not in mathe-
matical form. In the same vein, he maintained that the indifference curves for 
the “collectivity […] will follow from the indifference curves of the indivi-
duals” (ibid, §99). It is only implicit that the effects of changing income distri-
bution (for a given aggregate income) on demand are disregarded or assumed 
away. This was different from the aggregation of heterogeneous utilities. In fact, 
in the first extension of the general equilibrium model to international trade 
(see Maneschi, 1993), Pareto criticized J.E. Cairnes’s international trade theory 
for assuming that there is a “certain person named ‘society’ and that it is the 
sacrifices made by that person that one considers” (1964 [1896-1897], §859). 
However, “society is composed of different people, and the ‘sacrifices’ they 
make while cooperating in production are heterogeneous quantities, which 
one would not know how to sum together” (ibid.). Towards the end of his Cours, 
Pareto wondered whether the “theory of comparisons of ophelimities” (that 
is, index-numbers of real income) would eventually lead to the concept of a 
“social aggregate” analogous to an “aggregate of material molecules” of the 
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theory of elasticity in physics (ibid., t.II, p.409). That was before he developed 
the notion of individual and social indifference curves in the Manuel.
Pareto was not at the beginning sceptical of the analytical use of the aggre-
gative concept of “society” in economics (2007 [1892-1893], p.64-74). In his 
cardinalist years he argued that the notion of “average marginal utility” of 
an aggregate of individuals was necessary for the investigation of the laws of 
exchange, as demand theory would be “useless if only applicable to single indi-
viduals” (ibid., p.73; see also Baranzini and Bridel, 2005). He assumed that there 
was no exchange between members of such an aggregate (called “society”), 
but only between that aggregate and the remaining individuals.5 Pareto clai-
med that whereas in “primitive societies the socio-economic unit may be 
the individual”, with a better division of labour “the unit becomes an aggre-
gate of many people, all of them offering certain commodities and requiring 
others” (ibid., p.65). He defined the average marginal utility of a commodity for 
that society as “that final degree of utility that for one individual would have as 
consequence the demand for the supply observed for the society” (ibid., p.64). 
It is clearly implied here the notion of a representative agent.6 
The notion of representative households appeared also in the empirical 
sources used by economists and social scientists at the time. Economics was 
concerned with annual aggregate consumption data provided by general statis-
tics, but that was also revealed by and compatible with the “much more detailed 
statistics compiled in accordance with Le Play’s method” (Pareto, 2005 [1896-
1897], §928, p.8). He was referring to Frederic Le Play’s (1877-1879  [1855]) 
studies of consumption through the device of detailed investigations of the 
budgets of representative families in order to describe their standard of living. 
Le Play is generally regarded as the creator of the case-study method in social 
sciences. As described by Porter, “Le Play’s budgets provided the basis for a 
5 This is reminiscent of Jevons’s “trading bodies”. The same applies to the next quotation.
6 Lecouteux (2013) has argued that – since Pareto analyzed in his pure economics social market 
equilibrium and not isolated individuals – he defined the economic man as a representative 
agent, in the sense of the idealization of a group of individuals instead of the psychological 
behaviour of a real individual. The notion of representative agent, on the other hand, does 
not extend to Pareto’s sociology, where heterogeneity prevails (Tusset, 2013).
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microsociology in which the whole is made visible by the close analysis of a 
part”, through the selection of a “typical or representative family” (2011, p.297; 
see also Higgs 1890 for a contemporary assessment of Le Play’s method). In his 
chapter about income distribution and consumption, Pareto referred extensi-
vely to family monograph studies made by the “Le Play School” (1964 [1896-
1897], §985-989). Changes in aggregate consumption would provide the foun-
dation of Pareto’s interpretation of business cycles. 
3. CONSUMPTION AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE
Pareto’s focus on average economic conditions was partly based on his view 
that the economic aggregate is in a “perpetual state of motion”, as put in the 
title of the opening section of the Cours’ chapter on “economic crises” (Pareto’s 
term for business cycles). This was illustrated by the fluctuation of market prices 
around their long-run equilibrium values. Pareto (1964 [1896-1897], §101, §892) 
referred to Walras’s tâtonnement (called marchandage by Pareto) as the mechanism 
through which the market solves the equations of general equilibrium. In 
reality, as pointed out by Pareto, equilibrium is never reached, for “as one tries 
to come closer [to equilibrium] it changes continuously because the technical 
and economic conditions of production change. The real state is therefore one 
of continuous oscillations around a central point of equilibrium, which is itself 
displaced” (ibid., §101). He used the mathematical notion of courbes de poursuite 
(also known as the “dog-and-his-master problem”) to argue that the objective 
itself may change as a consequence of the means used to attain it, and the firm 
may travel along one of these “pursuit curves” (ibid., §41; 1971 [1909], chap-
ter V, §11). Marchandage is carried out in real-life markets by means of “specu-
lation”, defined by Pareto as the operation through which entrepreneurs and 
traders try to approach, “as promptly as possible”, the solution to the equations of 
economic equilibrium (1964 [1896-1897], §892, §901). The perfect adaptation of 
production to consumption depends on the forecasts made by speculators, which 
are often inaccurate (Pareto, 1971 [1909], chapter IX, §76-77). Pareto illustrated 
that in paragraph 41 of the Cours, with the help of pursuit curves: an increase in 
consumption causes a more than proportional increase of production, as entre-
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preneurs tend to believe that the increase in demand will continue indefinitely, 
that is, they provide not only for current demand but also for expected future 
demand. “This is one of the causes of production crises”, he suggested. 
Pareto’s approach to the business cycle, however, was not built on the 
notion of oscillations around equilibrium. His suggestion of non-tâtonnement 
disequilibrium was just that, an underdeveloped suggestion. As pointed out 
by Schumpeter (1949, p.159), Pareto used it to show that the convergence to 
unique and stable equilibrium was more doubtful than Walras and others 
tended to believe, with no indication of how to elaborate a positive theory of 
dynamic disequilibrium though. It is worth noting that Pareto distinguished 
the business cycle from the continuous “vibrations of the molecules” of the 
economy in different directions. Those movements, which are related to the 
allocation of productive factors to different sectors of the economic aggre-
gate, tend to offset each other. The business cycle, on the other hand, is about 
general states of economic depression or prosperity, when “almost all of these 
movements of the elements of the economic complexus occur in the same 
direction” (Pareto, 1971 [1909], chapter IX, §73). That was the third and final 
stage in the study of pure economics:
The depiction of the economic phenomenon is now complete. We began by 
assuming that the molecules of the economic aggregate are in equilibrium; we 
then examined certain of their movements; lastly, we ventured the conception 
of an aggregate which is wholly in motion. By proceeding from the simple 
notion of ophelimity, we have thus succeeded in depicting extremely varied 
and complex phenomena (Pareto, 2005 [1896-1897], §927, p.6-7).
Pareto’s contrast between partial over-production (compensated by partial 
under-production) on one side, and general changes in production on the 
other did not lead to the development of the concept of aggregate general 
over-production, which he rejected. Echoing orthodox views on Say’s Law, he 
argued that “an excess of all productions is as absurd as an increase of all values. 
Some productions may well be in excess relative to some others, but this excess 
itself acts to bring the system to its equilibrium position” (1964 [1896-1897], 
t.II, p.406-407; see also 1971 [1909], chapter IX, §83). Here again, he shared 
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Jevons’s company (1965 [1871], p.202-203). In paragraph 928 of his Cours, Pareto 
outlined an “essay on the dynamics of the economic aggregate” based on the 
study of the “conditions of equilibrium” of the economic system through time. 
Average consumption of commodities per unit of time, according to Pareto, 
was akin to velocities in physics. Pareto’s notion of “dynamics” was heavily 
influenced by D’Alembert Principle and the corresponding notion of “iner-
tia” in mechanics (Donzelli, 1997; Boianovsky and Tarascio, 1998). Because 
of their habits, economic agents change their demand and supply patterns 
only gradually. A change in the velocity of the consumption of commodity A 




 means consumption of A during a small unit of 
time (a “day”). The effort required by the individual to effect this change is the 
inertial function             .




 is the marginal ophelimity of commodity A. Moreover, the budget 
constraint of the consumer is given by:
(2)
where S, T… stand for the amounts of different kinds of capital (including 
human capital and land) owned by the individual, and r
e
 is the amount of 
money he adds or withdraws from his savings. For entrepreneurs, the inertial 
function                    measure the difficulties experiencing by them in changing 





 is the cost of production of A. Equations (1), (2) and (3), together with 
equations (3), (5), (6) and (7) of paragraph 100 of the Cours7, gave what Pareto 
called “general equations for the dynamics of economic systems” (2005 [1896-
1897], §928, p.10). The general equilibrium system of paragraph 100 is formed by 
7 Which express costs of production of each commodity, amounts of commodities produced 
and factor services employed, and equality between the demand for factor services and the 
amounts employed.
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θ individuals, m commodities and n factor services, with (m + n)θ + m +n equations. 
One of the equations follows from the others because of the budget constraint, so 
that the number of independent equations is the same as the number of variables. 
This is a depiction of a non-monetary economy in full-employment equilibrium.
Pareto’s main purpose in the chapter about economic crises was to demons-
trate that the economic aggregate oscillates cyclically. In order to do that, he 
discussed a simplified version of the system described above, with a single 
individual. The individual is a rentier who receives a constant flow of income 
r
s
, spends part of it on the only good A and saves the rest r
e
. The only economic 
decision made by the rentier is the date of consumption of A. As explained by 
Pareto in section 108 of the book, two goods materially identical are “econo-
mically distinct if they are not in the same place or cannot be enjoyed at the 
same time”. Hence, his was a model with two physically identical commo-
dities consumed at different dates by a single agent. Pareto further assumed 
that “prices are constant” (2005 [1986-1897], §928, p.10). In the context of his 
model, this meant that the rate of interest (relative price of A at different dates) 
is constant. The first order condition is:
and the budget constraint is:
Pareto put r
a
= α + x where α is a constant and x a small variable quantity. By 
making some assumptions and using Taylor expansion, he obtained a differential 
equation in x, whose cyclical solution was given by x= (1/h) sin (c + kht), where k 
is an integral constant and c an arbitrary constant. The model, claimed Pareto, 
shows that “x is a periodic function, and consumption perpetually fluctuates 
around the value α , in diverging from it by at most (1/h)” (ibid., p.11). Pareto’s 
result that consumption follows a cyclical path of constant amplitude led him 
to claim that the “general equations we have just obtained for the economic 
aggregate” are a “remarkable” depiction of “all the observable phenomena” and 
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represent the “best proof” that the general equilibrium system is in “complete 
harmony with the nature of things” (ibid.). 
As it happens, Pareto’s model was mathematically flawed, as first shown by 
Knut Wicksell (1958 [1899]) in his German review of volume 2 of the Cours.8 
Given the assumptions of the model, consumption is not cyclical but converges 
to a single value (for details see Benhabib, 1979; Boianovsky and Tarascio, 1998). 
However, our main interest here is not to discuss the mathematical structure 
of Pareto’s model, but its economic features. Jess Benhabib (1979) has rectified 
Pareto’s inertial model by assuming that utility depends positively on the levels 
of consumption and leisure and positively (negatively) on increases (decreases) 
in consumption and leisure. He concluded that consumption and leisure 
oscillate cyclically in a Paretian model with habit formation. Benhabib’s is a 
representative agent model with consumption and leisure, instead of consump-
tion and saving. Pareto’s model of cyclical consumption may in principle be 
interpreted as a representative agent model as well. He maintained that his 
theoretical results established cyclical changes in aggregate consumption as the 
main fact to be investigated in the study of economic fluctuations. 
The symptoms of crises are now clear. If we knew the velocities at which 
goods are produced and consumed, our knowledge of the movements that 
constitute the crisis would, according to earlier statements (§928), be perfect. 
But statistics are incapable of providing us with such comprehensive infor-
mation. It is therefore a matter of searching among the easily observable facts 
(Pareto, 2005 [1896-1897], §939, p.16).
In the absence of annual information about consumption, Pareto found a 
proxy in data about changes in the velocity of circulation of money and in bank 
reserves and deposits collected by Pierre des Essars, Clément Juglar and others. 
Again, he referred to his model of paragraph 928 when stating that “it is quite 
8 There is no evidence that Wicksell and Pareto corresponded about the Cours. Pareto ac-
knowledged in a letter of 5 March 1894 (in the Wicksell Papers, Lund University Library) 
receipt of Wicksell’s Wert, Kapital und Rente, but informed that he could not understand it 
properly due to his imperfect knowledge of German. Anyway, Pareto eventually admitted 
that the model of paragraph 928 was mistaken (see Boianovsky and Tarascio, 1998). 
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remarkable that the rational study of crises leads us directly to seek the origin of 
crises in variations in the velocities of receipts and debts (§928)” (ibid., §945, p.20). 
Even if the model of an individual agent provided the foundations of 
Pareto’s interpretation of the business cycle, he felt compelled to discuss why 
individuals in general would move in the same direction and bring about 
aggregate fluctuations in consumption and, therefore, in production. Business 
cycles occur when the “vibrations” that affect the economic aggregate become 
“synchronic” instead of counteracting each other (ibid., §929, p.12; 1971 [1909], 
chapter IX, §78). The similarities between individuals in the economic realm 
mean that they share a common behaviour and reaction pattern, just like in 
physics the vibrations of molecules “interfere with and overlay with each 
other” (Pareto, 2005 [1896-1897], §926, p.6). The movement of a “single mole-
cule” of the economic aggregate will gradually attract the others, reflecting the 
existence of forces ensuring that the “molecules of the economic aggregate are 
closed link” (ibid., §929, p.12). Hence, it was homogeneity instead of heteroge-
neity among agents that mattered for Pareto’s economic approach to business 
cycles. He found in the notion of “resonance” yet another physical metaphor 
to illustrate his argument:
We then observe a similar phenomenon to that known in physics as ‘reso-
nance’. If we take several crystal glasses of various dimensions and cause one 
to vibrate, the others remain still. But if all the glasses are the same size and 
capable of sounding the same note, the others will pick up the vibration and 
the sound is considerably augmented (ibid.).
The model of an individual consumer developed in paragraph 928 is valid 
on the grounds that consumers as a whole tend to act the same way. Wicksell 
thought that Pareto’s model of a single rentier would be able to generate a wave-
like movement in the aggregate only if “perchance the behaviour of many indivi-
duals is influenced in the same direction”, with no reference to the “resonance” 
argument (1953 [1907], p.59). Pareto distinguished “subjective” from “objective” 
synchronism. The first was defined as the “capacity of the greatest number 
of people in a given society to experience at a certain moment feelings that 
make them behave in the same way” (2005 [1896-1897],  §930, p.12). Objective 
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synchronism resulted from changes in the parameters of economic equilibrium 
affecting a large number of individuals, such as technical progress, food shor-
tages, or changes in tastes. Probably because he did not envisage a hypothesis 
about cyclical changes in the conditions of economic equilibrium, Pareto stressed 
subjective instead of objective synchronism. He applied the notion not only to 
his model of cyclical consumption, but also to aggregative shifts in l’état d’esprit des 
hommes (1964 [1896-1897], §934) capable of producing alternate periods of over-
confidence and general mistrust (see also Pareto, 1971 [1909], chapter IX, §79). 
It is possible to find in Pareto’s chapter on crises the notion of waves of pessi-
mism and optimism determined by overshooting in individuals’ adaptation 
to their expectations (Kirman, 1998, p.19). However, Wicksell’s critical inter-
pretation – that Pareto assumed that “the individual or society could forecast 
the future with certainty” (1953 [1907], p.60) – fits better not just the model of 
paragraph 928 but the central message of the chapter as a whole. Indeed, Pareto 
eschewed anti-cyclical policies (1964 [1896-1897], §949); see also Bridel, 2012). 
His statement that business cycles “are not caused by the ‘abuse of credit’: they 
would occur if credit did not exist” (2005 [1896-1897], §931, p.13) is fully consis-
tent with his formal equilibrium model.9
Pareto (2008 [1901]) would make yet another attempt to put forward 
equations of motion of the economic aggregate, this time without using the 
notion of “inertia” or “habit”. Instead of dealing with periods or intervals of 
time and changes in velocities, he assumed an economy progressing in conti-
nuous time. Growth economics is the natural territory of macroeconomics, 
since the economic system as a whole moves in the same direction. The 
number of individuals, commodities and productive factors is the same as in 
the general equilibrium system of paragraph 100 of the Cours. There is capital 
accumulation, but no population growth. In that sense, it is a multi-commo-
dity model, not a fully-fledged aggregative growth model as Gustav Cassel 
would advance for the first time later. Pareto, however, attempted to move 
towards an aggregative level. In order to simplify notation, he wrote the 
9 Nevertheless, there was room for the notion of “involuntary unemployment” (chômage 
involontaire) in Pareto’s Cours (see Boianovsky andTrautwein, 2003, p.391).
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consumption and saving equations for a single individual only, which were 
(implicitly) “repeated for all individuals”. But he now used the symbol ∑ to 
represent a “sum extended to all the individuals in the community” (Pareto, 
2008 [1901], p.505-506). Aggregate income and aggregate expenditure were 
treated as the sum of individual values, with no distinction among indivi-
dual functions or an explanation of the aggregation procedure. From a broad 
perspective, Pareto’s 1901 equations of dynamic equilibrium were based, like 
the previous ones in his Cours, on the generalization of the saving behaviour 
of a single individual. In both cases Pareto stopped short of developing an 
aggregative model of savings and growth.
CONCLUSION
Pareto’s model of the rentier in paragraph 928 of his Cours should be under-
stood as an exercise in the dynamics of the “individual economy”. It provi-
ded the backbone of his approach to business cycles as regular oscillations 
in aggregate consumption. Although Pareto recanted the model in his Manuel, 
he kept discussing economic fluctuations of the economic aggregate in terms 
of changes in production led by the cyclical pattern of consumption. This 
accorded with his overall general equilibrium perspective, which saw consu-
mer behaviour as the leading factor in the working of the economic system. 
Like Irving Fisher (1961 [1892], chapters 4-6) – and similarly to the later Arrow-
Debreu approach to general equilibrium as well – Pareto did not aggregate indi-
vidual functions in his general equilibrium system. However, unlike Fisher 
and several other contemporary neoclassical economists, he did not deploy the 
quantity theory of money as a benchmark to study nominal and real aggregate 
dynamics.10 Again unlike his contemporaries, Pareto attempted a treatment of 
aggregate economic fluctuations as determined by the optimizing behaviour of 
economic agents in equilibrium, although without much success. 
10 Pareto’s critical attitude toward the quantity theory of money was developed in chapter II of 
Book I of his Cours.
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Attractive as it was, general equilibrium analysis was beset by the so-called 
Cournot problem. Pareto’s approach to business cycles was consistent with his 
general concern with average variables in economics. Like Jevons before him, 
Pareto focused not on the diversity of behaviour across individuals, but on 
average or aggregate patterns. However, it was not always clear how exactly 
such average entities should be constructed. Whereas Jevons put forward the 
notion of “trading bodies” to cope with differences among individuals, Pareto 
did not explain how to combine general equilibrium modelling with average 
phenomena. Jevons suggested, for example, that countries are regarded as 
trading bodies and the utility function (or indifference map, in Paretian termi-
nology) of a country is used in international trade theory. It was only much 
later that it became clear that such social indifference curves could only be 
built on the assumption of identically homothetic utility functions for all indi-
viduals (Gorman, 1953; Chipman, 1965). Pareto’s argument often came close 
to the notion of a representative agent, both in his microeconomics and in his 
treatment of the motion of the economic aggregate. Differently from his socio-
logy – dominated as it was by social heterogeneity revealed by Pareto’s Law of 
income distribution – Pareto’s pure economics assumed relative homogeneity 
across individuals. Sometimes, as in his 1907 letter to Furlan quoted above, he 
went as far as assuming that all individuals are identical. On other occasions, 
he borrowed the concept of resonance from physics to illustrate the conse-
quences of general similarities among economic agents. 
Surely, the representative agent in modern macroeconomics is not an 
average or typical individual (see Kirman, 1992). It has been sometimes illus-
trated by the Crusoe economy, a concept rejected by Pareto. Moreover, it 
applies strictly to models in which the behaviour of a single infinitely lived 
optimizing agent represents the macroeconomic behaviour of the aggregate 
of economic agents. The acknowledged influence is Ramsey (1928), but the 
concept of a representative infinitely lived individual made its first appea-
rance in Wicksell’s discussion of saving (see Boianovsky, 2013, a companion 
to this article). Wicksell neither extended that notion to his well-known 
discussion of the cumulative process, nor did he recognize the notion of 
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a representative agent in Pareto’s business cycle model. The view that the 
logic of aggregate changes – as indicated by the new concepts of aggregate 
demand and supply introduced by Wicksell and further elaborated as one 
of the foundations of macroeconomics in the 1930s – differs from strictly 
microeconomic reasoning was still foreign to Pareto. Instead, he sought in 
his microeconomic general equilibrium the analytical tools capable of illu-
minating the dynamics of the economic aggregate.
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